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Though currently indifferent, young Germans may begin to
reject the EU if economic conditions worsen.
by Blog Admin
As part of our Euroscepticism collaboration, Britta Busse, Alexandra Hashem-Wangler and
Jochen Tholen look at the attitudes of young Germans towards the EU. Using in-depth
interviews, they find that while German youth are generally positive about European
integration, they feel that the EU needs Germany more than Germany needs the EU. They
also warn that a deterioration in the economic situation for German young people may harden
their attitudes towards the European project. 
Until the start of  the Eurozone crisis, sociological research on integration in the European
Union depended very much on the idea of  “permissive consensus” by the people, meaning a
tacit acceptance of  EU policy. In this context and in Germany in particular, the polit ical and
economic elites who pushed f or the deepening and enlargement of  the EU, and f or the
introduction of  the euro, were not f orced to consider their relationship with, and the
approval of , Europe’s cit izens.
But this has changed. The newest research into public opinion in Europe has f ound a loss
of  trust and an increasingly unsettled relationship between Europe’s governing bodies and
voters. Now, the prevailing notion of  the EU’s relationship with its cit izens has developed
towards a “constraining dissensus”, as belief  in the comprehensive projects aimed at closer
European cooperation is no longer shared by the majority of  the people. In this context,
polit ical and economic elites in the member states, as well as at the European level, are
aware that the EU and its polit ical institutions are dependent on a certain degree of  public
approval. Particularly in those member states where the constitution does not allow f or a
ref erendum (like in Germany), polit icians are acting between two partly contradictory levels: The domestic
and national state level, and the European level.
We f ocus on two dif f erent Euroscepticism ‘stances’ that have been developed:
1. Sof t stance: This represents the crit icism of  single manif estations of  the EU, such as its policies and
institutions, without putting the entire EU into question,
2. Grim stance: This is a general rejection of  the entire polit ical and economic process of  EU integration.
In Germany, according to Eurobarometer data, the sense of  “EU
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In Germany, according to Eurobarometer data, the sense of  “EU
integration harmony”, between voters, social elites and polit ical
parties, which until relatively recently had been very stable, has
crashed. According to surveys f rom 2011, the proportion of
Germans that f eel that Germany benef its f rom the EU is 48 per
cent, lower than the EU average of  52 per cent. Using net-benef it
f igures (the number of  people who recognise benef its, minus
those people who do not see any benef its), the picture sharpens
even more. Whereas the EU average rate f or net-benef it is 15 per
cent, this rate is 6 per cent f or Germany. Only the rates in Italy (2
per cent), Cyprus (2 per cent), Latvia (0 per cent), Austria (-2 per
cent), Greece (-3 per cent), Hungary (-9 per cent) and the UK (-19
per cent) are lower.
In particular, the f urther enlargement of  the EU is now viewed very
crit ically by Germans. Eurobarometer demonstrates that in no
other EU member country, with the exception of  Austria, is the
rejection of  f urther EU enlargement so strong, at 71 per cent,
whereas only 22 per cent are pro-enlargement. What makes these
f igures all the more worrying is that all German governments have
acted as a driving f orce (together with France) f or the f urther
integration and enlargement of  the EU.
At present, it is unclear how Germans would react if  the country’s €190 billion share of  the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) loan guarantee was to actually turn into real payment obligations. Considering
that the people in Germany opposed the creation of  the euro more than in any other member state, we
assume that Germans (including young people, whose f utures might be deteriorating because of  the
Eurozone crisis) would become openly hostile towards the EU. This cannot be ignored by the economic and
polit ical elites.
As part of  the European MYPLACE project, in the late autumn of  2012 we interviewed 30 West German
young people between 16 and 25 about polit ics. When they were asked about the European Union and the
role of  Germany within it, young people generally mentioned some posit ive aspects, but were crit ical of  the
current polit ical state of  the EU. They perceive the EU as an elit ist project which does not encourage or
enable the polit ical participation of  young people.
Positive aspects of the EU 
The posit ive points most of ten highlighted by young people were the f reedom of  travel within the EU and
the f act that there is no longer a need to change currencies when traveling. Some also pointed out that the
abolit ion of  strict border controls also means easier import and export routines f or the economically strong
and centrally located Germany:
“Well, we are for sure a very, very important country in Europe, because of our economically
strength. There are many people living here, so we also play an important role, because of the
density of our population … . In former times, we were also considered as ‘Europe`s heart’ … or
we considered ourselves that way.”
Indifferent/ambivalent views on the EU 
For some young people, the central role of  Germany in the EU is also the reason that they have a crit ical
view of  the EU. They see that it is dif f icult f or Germany to play an important posit ion in the EU, because of
its f ormer involvement in the two World Wars. Nevertheless, Germany now has an economically strong
position within the EU f rom which many commitments have arisen: e.g. payments f or countries which are not
able to f ollow f inancial EU guidelines. Thus they think:
“Well, I think Germany is important for Europe. But actually I don`t think that Europe is that
important for Germany.”
Moreover, the majority of  young people crit icised the obligations that are being placed on Germany to
support indebted countries such as Greece. These respondents f ear that their country is being exploited
and believe that the f inancial support should be lower. Additionally, the interview participants expressed a
crit ical posit ion towards tendencies towards globalisation as these are connected with the clash of  very
dif f erent cultures and a loss of  sovereignty. They already f eel that they (as individuals) have very litt le
polit ical power within Germany. But one voice among 82 million voices counts more than one voice among
500 million voices in the EU:
“There are so many problems connected with it. First of all … suddenly there are not 80 million
voices any more, but, I don`t know, one billion voices? […] This means I suddenly have much
less power with my voice.”
Finally, our qualitative interviews illustrated that EU polit ics is not at all transparent f or German young
people. They f eel that there are f ewer prospects f or participating at the EU level than there are at the
national level. This leads us to the conclusion that there are emerging parallel worlds. 
On the one side, the parliamentary democracy of  an EU member state f osters tendencies towards
prof essionalised participation of  its cit izens at the national level, which is then much more complicated at
the EU level. Even though a range of  youth projects and init iatives that aim to f oster commitment to the EU
f ormally exist, these reach only a minority of  young people. None of  the individuals that we have
interviewed in this context has ever ref erred to participation in an EU-f unded project or organisation.
On the other side, there are young people who engage in projects and institutions that display a f orm of
self -organisation, mostly at the local level, that is distant f rom the conventional polit ical engagement
patterns that make any ref erence to the EU. Youths pref er to shif t their engagement f rom smaller to bigger
things – as they perceive it “f rom f easible projects to more abstract things”.
Currently young people in Germany pref er the “sof t stance” towards the EU. But if  the ESM’s loan
guarantees turn into real payment obligations (which has already started with a real cash payment of  €730
million f or 2013), and if  the socio-economic conditions in Germany worsen and thus the currently record
low youth unemployment rate of  7.9 per cent in January 2013 (the EU average is 23.6 per cent) increases, a
majority of  young people could move to a “grim stance” towards the EU, much sooner than expected.
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